It appears that – at least for now – the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is serving as the public face of the executive branch’s efforts to tackle the increasingly contentious debate about prescription drug prices. As we previously reported, following a May 25, 2017 budget hearing, FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb has made increased competition in the drug marketplace a high policy priority for the Agency. To that end, we have recently seen concrete steps being taken to advance Dr. Gottlieb’s multi-pronged “Drug Competition Action Plan.” Continue Reading FDA Stays in the Spotlight with Drug Pricing Moves, but Could Be Facing Risk as UFA Bill Loses Attention
During his first appearance before Congress as FDA Commissioner on May 25, 2017, Scott Gottlieb reported that the Agency is preparing a “Drug Competition Action Plan” that it will unveil in upcoming weeks and months. This was likely welcome news to many politicians from both parties, as well as to President Trump, who has publicly shamed pharmaceutical companies for the high prices of their products but has done little to advance concrete policies in this area.
Dr. Gottlieb has been consistent over the years, including during his recent confirmation process, in his view that FDA should take a more active role in fostering competition and reducing unnecessary regulatory barriers. So it was not surprising when he was selected by Trump to lead the Agency, nor when he received a relatively warm welcome from Senators concerned about the direction prices have been going in recent years. Continue Reading FDA Commissioner Hints at Drug Pricing-Related Initiatives
On December 22, 2014, a federal district court in New Jersey found that Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Mylan”) alleged facts sufficient to plead an antitrust claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act against defendant, Celgene Corporation (“Celgene”), for denying a generic rival access to samples of its branded drugs that are distributed pursuant to a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (“REMS”) program. Citing the Supreme Court’s decisions in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, and other relevant cases that discuss the scope of an affirmative duty to deal with rivals, the District Court preserved the Plaintiff’s Section 2 claim by finding that Celgene’s conduct fit within one of the limited exceptions to the general rule that there is no duty to deal with competitors, concluding that antitrust liability could be found without allegations of a prior course or history of dealing with the Plaintiff. The attached antitrust alert, “Court Rules Antitrust Claim May Proceed Against Celgene,” highlights the noteworthy aspects of this decision, including the fact that this is one of the few cases to address potential liability under Section 2 in connection with FDA-required REMS programs and is likely to be instructive on such issues as litigation in this area unfolds. The Court’s analysis also adds to the continuing debate over the application of Section 2 to situations involving a refusal to deal with a rival, as lower courts continue to adopt disparate interpretations of the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko.